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1 Introduction
High interest rate spreads in developing countries have concerned economists and policy-
makers for a long time. This has been particularly true in Latin America, where countries
have traditionally exhibited spreads well above those observed in other developing coun-
tries. In all likelihood the causes of such abnormally high intermediation margins are
varied; limited enforcement of contracts, scale economies, high risk from volatile industries
(such as commodity producers), may all play a role. Nonetheless, low bank competition
has often been viewed as an important determinant of high cost of credit in this region of
the world (Gelos (2009), Haber (2009)).
The relationship between bank competition and the conditions under which firms can
access credit is rather complex. On the one hand, basic industrial organization economics
would suggest that if intermediaries can exercise market power, they will extract rents
from borrowers, increasing the cost of credit and limiting access to finance. On the other
hand, however, some market power may be necessary to allow intermediaries to recover
the cost of information acquisition in an environment of asymmetric information (Petersen
and Rajan (1995)).
Since competition is for the most part unobservable, applied economists have always
relied on proxy measures to capture its evolution. Unfortunately, this means that the use
of different proxies for capturing competition has resulted in a wide array of conclusions
about the underlying relationship between competition and interest rate spreads.
With this paper, we make two main contributions to the understanding of bank com-
petition in credit markets. First, we provide up-to-date measures of bank market power
in a developing country (Colombia) using recently developed methods–such as the Boone
profit and market share elasticity regressions–and primary sources for bank financial data.
Second and most important, we provide estimates of the effect of bank market power on
the cost of firms bank finance.
Our study of the effect of bank market power on firm interest rates introduces two
methodological improvements with respect to the extant literature. First, we construct
and use four measures of bank market power: two Lerner indices, a profit Boone indicator
and a market share Boone indicator. By constructing our own market power measures
from primary sources, we aim to diminish measurement error that is sometimes attributed
to large data aggregators. In using both the profit and market share Boone elasticities, we
are able to detect if banks are exercising market power in either margin. Moreover, the
use of these four market power indicators allows us to compare our results with most of
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the recent studies of bank competition.
Second, we build a unique dataset that matches individual loans with firm and bank-
level data, including market power and other bank characteristics. This allows us to
overcome some of the limitations found in recent studies of this type. In particular, we
can: (i) directly observe interest rates from each loan rather than derive them implicitly
from accounting data, (ii) control for loan-specific characteristics such as term, size or
collateral, and (iii) properly account for time-varying, unobserved firm-level heterogeneity
(like demand-side shocks), and bank characteristics.
Our results suggest that bank competition was relatively low in 2004-2005, increased
during 2006-2008 and has decreased systematically ever since. By most measures, bank
competition today (2014) is close to its relatively low level of 2004-2005. Interestingly,
the increase in bank competition during 2006-2008 occurred as the industry became more
concentrated, highlighting the importance of distinguishing between concentration and
competition measures.
Our results also indicate that, conditional on the length of a credit relationship, banks
that loose average (or objective) market power do raise interest rates for small firms (and
lower them for large firms). However, and most importantly, conditional on firm size, banks
that loose average (or objective) market power lower interest rates to firms with which they
have short credit histories, but increase them for firms with which they have long-standing
relationships. This is suggestive of the existence of (subjective) market power that is
specific to the bank-firm relationship, and of informational lock-in and hold-up problems
due to switching costs. It also suggests that size may be capturing other firm attributes
such as observable risk, scale effects or implicit collateral.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review
on bank competition and points to the main gaps that this paper intends to fill. Section 3
presents a brief overview of the banking system in Colombia. Section 4 presents the bank
competition measures and discusses the methodological details. The fifth section details
our study on the relationship between bank market power and the cost of firm finance.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Early empirical studies of bank competition found that U.S. banks in more concentrated
local markets, as measured by the Herfindahl Index, charge higher rates on SME loans and
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pay lower rates on retail deposits (e.g., Berger and Hannan (1989)), and that their deposit
rates are slow to respond to changes in open-market interest rates (e.g., Neumark and
Sharpe (1992)). Beyond the U.S., Beck et al. (2004) argued that in a sample of 74 countries,
concentration appeared to constraint access to finance, although this effect seemed to
apply only to countries with low levels of economic and institutional development. The
results from these studies that relied on concentration measures were quickly contested by
researchers who argued empirically in favor of the efficient structure hypothesis: the idea
that high concentration endogenously reflects the market share gains of efficient firms (e.g.,
Smirlock (1985)).
In recent years, a myriad of papers have made it clear that using concentration as a
measure of competition can be misleading (see e.g., Carbo-Valverde et al. (2009)). In fact,
a number of authors have shown that concentration and competition may be uncorrelated
or even positively correlated (Kroszner and Strahan (1999); Claessens and Laeven (2004)).
In light of these developments, more recent studies have focused on non-structural measures
of competition, i.e., measures that do not rely on the link between structure and conduct
to infer market power. In general, these non-structural measures extract conclusions about
competitive pressure by directly observing the conduct of firms in the market.
One such measure that has attracted a lot of attention from researchers is the Lerner
index. In this index, market power of a firm is identified by the divergence between
the firm’s price and its marginal cost. Another example of non-structural measures of
competition is the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistic which captures the transmission of
input prices on firms’ revenues; weak transmission is indicative of the exercise of market
power. More recently, Boone (2008) proposed a new measure based on the idea that
efficient firms are more highly rewarded in more competitive markets. In practice, this
idea is captured as the elasticity of profits or market share to marginal costs.
A number of studies have used these two measures of competition to investigate a variety
of issues such as access to finance, cost of funds or financial stability. For instance, Hainz
et al. (2013) uses the Lerner index and data from a sample of loans from 70 countries to
conclude that more competition reduces the incidence of collateral in loan contracts. Casu
and Girardone (2009) uses the Lerner index and a sample of European Union countries
to conclude that increases in banks’ monopoly power does not translate into a decrease in
cost efficiency. For Latin America, Tabak et al. (2015) uses the H-statistic to examine the
competitive behavior of the Brazilian banking industry; the paper finds that market power
of Brazilian banks is negatively related to their risk-taking behavior.
Four papers that appear highly relevant for the current study are Love and Martinez-
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Peria (2015), Leon (2015), Ryan et al. (2014) and Alvarez and Jara (2016). The first
of these papers uses firm-level data from the Enterprise Surveys and conclude that low
competition–as measured by the Lerner index and the Boone indicator–constraints access
to finance where the latter is measured by a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the
firm had some kind of credit line with a financial institution. Leon (2015) conducts a similar
exercise but uses instead a measure of financial constraints that includes not only if the firm
had a credit line or not, but also information about whether the firm was denied credit or
was discouraged from applying for a loan. The results in this latter paper are also suggestive
of a negative effect of market power on access to finance. Ryan et al. (2014) also finds that
higher bank market power–captured by the Lerner index–tends to increase firm financing
constraints in a large sample of SMEs from 20 European countries. Finally, Alvarez and
Jara (2016) uses a sample of listed firms from six Latin American countries to investigate
the relationship between bank competition–measured by the Boone indicator–and financial
constraints. In contrast to the previous three papers, the authors present evidence that
higher bank competition results in more stringent financial constraints for firms.
Perhaps the two papers most closely related to ours are Fungacova et al. (2017) and
van Leuvensteijn et al. (2013). Fungacova et al. (2017) uses a large dataset of firm-level
data from the Euro area to conclude that competition–measured using the Lerner indices
and the H-statistic–increases the cost of credit, and observe that the positive influence of
bank competition is stronger for smaller companies. These results are somewhat in conflict
with those from van Leuvensteijn et al. (2013) which uses the Boone indicator to find, also
in a sample of European banks, that higher competition reduces interest rate spreads for
most loan products.
There are a few limitations worth pointing out in these studies. To begin with, the
paper by Fungacova et al. (2017) uses either concentration measures, the Lerner Index or
the H-statistic. These measures may have important flaws specially when compared with
the Boone indicator which is not used. Moreover, the paper can only approximate the cost
of credit at the firm-level using accounting data. The papers by Love and Martinez-Peria
(2015), Leon (2015) and Alvarez and Jara (2016) make use of the Boone indicator but
rather than looking at interest rate spreads are forced to use a dichotomous measure of
financial constraints due to data limitations. Alvarez and Jara (2016) has the additional
disadvantage that only listed firms were used in the study. Ryan et al. (2014) does construct
a continuous variable of financial constraints but uses only the Lerner index. Finally, while
van Leuvensteijn et al. (2013) uses the market-share version of the Boone indicator and
studies the impact on interest rates, the dependent variable in the main regressions comes
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from the banks themselves. That is, they use segment-wide (mortgage, short-term, deposit
accounts) averages of interest rates rather than the actual rates faced by individual firms.
All of these studies also have to deal imperfectly with unobserved heterogeneity as they all
use country-level competition measures (i.e., cannot use country level fixed effects).
3 The Banking Industry in Colombia 2004-20141
The 2004-2014 period in Colombian banking was characterized by a number of legal and
regulatory innovations that brought about important changes in the industry. First, as a
(belated) response to the 1999 financial crisis that caused the largest macroeconomic reces-
sion in the country, a new law was introduced in 2004 (“Ley 795 de 2003”) which advanced
the consolidation of the regulation and supervision of the financial industry. The follow-up
regulation of this law came with a decree put forth in 2005 (“decreto 4323 de 2005”) in
which banking and capital markets supervision–previously carried out by Superbancaria
and Supervalores, respectively–was centralized into a single institution, Superfinanciera.
Additional secondary regulation introduced in 2009 (“circulares externas 14 y 28 de 2009”)
required banks to adopt internal control systems aimed at effectively controlling risks, while
in 2012 a new decree increased both liquidity and capital requirements for banks.
These regulatory changes helped the Colombian financial system cope with the 2007-
2009 global financial crisis relatively well. Non performing loans (NPLs) reached a maxi-
mum of 4% during this period, which was significantly below the 10% experienced during
the 1999 crisis. Moreover, the profitability indicators of the banking system (return over
assets, ROA, and return over equity, ROE) remained relatively stable during 2007-2009.
Two main features characterize the evolution of the banking sector in Colombia during
2004-20014. First, banks that had been bailed out during the 1999 crisis and ended up in
government hands were privatized. By 2008, there was only one state-owned commercial
bank remaining (Banco Agrario). Instead, the government has focused its participation in
the financial industry through second-tier (development) banks which service some specific
sectors of the economy (e.g., Finagro which is mostly agriculture-oriented, Bancoldex which
has a substantial SME component, FDN which specializes in infrastructure finance). Sec-
ondly, during 2005-2007, Colombia moved from a specialization model (where, e.g., banks
were chartered with a specific purpose such as housing finance), toward a “multibank”
or “universal banking” model; one in which banks are able to offer bank a wide array of
1A comprehensive review of the Colombian financial system history can be found in Ocampo (2015).
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financial services under the same roof.2 Although special purpose banks were in princi-
ple allowed to operate, these were mostly absorbed by larger multi-purpose banks. This
brought about a marked increase in concentration within the banking industry, which is
captured vividly by the evolution if the market share of the 3 largest banks, as well as by
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index depicted in Figure 1. A subsequent trend toward more
concentration has prevailed since, with the three largest individual banks (bank holding
companies) currently controlling around 60% (70%) of the commercial loan market.
A complete list of mergers and acquisitions that took place in the Colombian banking
sector during this period is presented in Table 7 of Apendix 7.1, along with a list of new
bank entries. Most of these new entrants are special-purpose banks such as Banco Falabella,
which offers consumer credit for Falabella’s retail business, and Bancoomeva which is also
focused on small-scale financial services (mostly consumer credit) and has limited or null
participation in the productive (commercial) credit market.
4 Measuring Bank Competition in Colombia
As discussed in section 2, the new empirical industrial organization literature has developed
and used measures of competition that are directly related to market conduct. Accord-
ingly, in this section we estimate two measures of bank-level price-cost margins–Lerner
indices–and two measures of marginal cost elasticities–Boone indicators. The first measure
and the one most widely used in our subsequent firm-level analysis (section 5) is the orig-
inal Lerner index developed by Lerner (1934), which captures the ability of an individual





where Pbt and MCbt are, respectively, the price charged by bank b in period t, and its
marginal cost. Higher values of the Lerner index suggest higher market power. Since this
paper is concerned with competition in the credit market, our price measure is the ratio
of financial income (i.e., interest income, fees) to total net loans. Obtaining a measure
of marginal cost requires estimating a total operating cost (TOC) function which we do
below.
2This reform push was partly inspired by a kind of consensus within academic and policymaker circles
that the banking industry in Colombia could become much more efficient and profit from economies of
scale (Clavijo (2000); Ferrufino (1991)) .
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Our second measure of market power is the simple adjustment to the Lerner index
suggested by Koetter et al. (2012). The idea is none other than to control for possible
profit or cost inefficiency such that the adjusted Lerner index is found as:
AdjLbt =
πbt + TOCbt − MCbtQbt
πbt + TOCbt
(2)
where πbt stands for predicted profits, TOCbt is predicted TOC and Qbt is total output. In
our measures, we use actual figures for profits, output and cost, instead of predicted ones.
Our third and fourth measures are Boone indicators that capture the elasticity of profits
and market shares to changes in marginal costs. Boone (2008) shows that there is a
continuous and monotonically increasing relationship between relative profit differences and
the level of competition. This implies that when competition is more intense, efficient banks
gain more in profits or market shares with respect of the inefficient ones. To capture this
profit and market share elasticity to changes in marginal costs, we estimate the following
regressions:
ln πbt = α + βπbt ln MCbt + ϑbt (3)
ln MSbt = α + βMSbt ln MCbt + ϑbt (4)
where estimates of βMSbt and βπbt capture bank-specific, time-varying profit and market
share elasticities with respect to marginal costs. Notice that marginal cost elasticities are
expected to be negative, so larger βMSbt and βπbt (i..e., smaller | βMSbt |, | βπbt |) are suggestive
of higher market power.
The computation of all four measures requires estimates of bank-specific marginal costs,
MCbt. In order to obtain these, we estimate a multi-product TOC function using a para-
metric approach. We follow much of the empirical banking literature (Koetter et al. (2012),
van Leuvensteijn et al. (2013), Tabak et al. (2012)), and estimate a translog cost function,
which is a second order Taylor-series approximation to an unknown cost function. In
particular, our estimated TOC function is:






















λpj ln wibt ln ypbt +
T −1∑
t=1
νtdt + δ ln zbt + εbt (5)
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where αb is a bank fixed effect, y1bt and y2bt are, respectively, loans and securities; w1bt is
the labor unit cost or wage (personnel expenses/total assets), w2bt represents the cost of
funding for the bank (interest expenses/deposits), w3bt is computed as other expenses/fixed
assets, and the time dummy dt ∈ {0, 1} is intended to capture aggregate shocks. Finally,
we follow Mester (1996) and also include bank equity (as a share of total assets), zbt, since
it can be used to fund loans and reflects different risk attitudes of banks. We impose
homogeneity of degree 1 on input prices by dividing all factor prices and TOC by w3.















We estimate equation (5) using a quarterly dataset of 15 banks over the period 2004q1-
2014q4. These 15 banks represented over 98.8% of total commercial loans in 2014. A
complete description of the variable definitions and data sources, as well as the results
from the estimation of equation (5) are presented in Appendix 7.2.
Table 3 presents some descriptive statistics about our sample of banks. It is worth
noting that for the average and median bank in Colombia, commercial (business) loans
represent around 53%-54% of their loan portfolios, over 10 percentage points more than
what they represent for U.S. banks (44% in 2016). This is particularly important for our
subsequent exercise in which we estimate the impact of bank market power on the cost of
business loans. Also worth noting is the fact that banks in Colombia rely more heavily in
equity as their equity to asset ratio stands at 14.3%, compared with 11% in recent years
in the U.S. (used to be well below 10% in the U.S.).
Equipped with estimates of marginal costs, we are in a position to compute Lerner
indices, and estimating equations (3) and (4). Estimating the latter two models is not
straightforward, however, since we need to estimate models with coefficients that vary over
time and across banks (panels). We do so by estimating the fixed-effect ANOVA model of
Hsiao (2003), in which βπbt = βπ + βπb + βπt and βMSbt = βMS + βMSb + βMSt . This method
requires that we use a balanced panel which means that our sample reduces to 11 banks.3
Figure 2 below depicts the estimated Lerner indices and Boone indicators. The plots
include the unweighted averages (black line), as well as the median (blue) for the Lerners.4
3As with equation (5), we estimate the profit and market share elasticities using time fixed-effects.
4Given the fixed coefficient nature of the Hsiao (2003) model, the mean and the median of the Boone
indicators only differ in their intercepts.
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All measures of bank market power suggest the same broad temporal patterns.5 Mar-
ket power decreased substantially as the system moved from specialization to universal
banking during 2005-2007. Notice that this happened at the same time that concentra-
tion was intensifying (see Figure 1). Bank market power then increased sharply during
2008-2011, in the wake and aftermath of the global financial crisis. This is consistent with
the data provided by Clerides et al. (2015) showing that bank market power increased
worldwide during this period, and with available evidence from other countries and indus-
tries that price markups (i.e., the Lerner index) are mostly countercyclical (Wilson and
Reynolds (2005)). During 2011-2012 bank market power fell again, but has been increasing
moderately since.
Table 2 presents pairwise correlations between (unweighted) average market power and
concentration measures. Overall, correlations among our four market power are fairly high
and comparable to those found in Clerides et al. (2015).6 Interestingly, the correlations
between the market power and the concentration measures are either negative or very low
and not statistically significant at the 5% confidence level. This is consistent with previous
evidence that highlights the potential divergence between market power and concentration
measures, and cautions against the use of concentration as a proxy for bank competition
(Fernández et al. (2005)).
5 Bank Market Power and the Cost of Credit
We now turn to the second and more important contribution of this paper: the estimation
of the effect of market power on the cost of credit to non-financial firms. To do so, we
assemble a unique dataset that links loan, firm and bank-level data from separate sources.
While we lack a strict identification strategy, our rich dataset allows us to control for many
sources of firm and bank –observed and unobserved, fixed and time-varying– heterogeneity,
so that our estimations are suggestive in terms of causality. Our results indicate that,
once bank characteristics and unobserved firm-heterogeneity are properly accounted for,
banks loosing overall market power –measured by the average price-cost margin– decrease
interest rates to small firms, but increase rates to firms with which they have the oldest
credit relationships.
5Detailed behavior of the Lerner indices for banks in our sample is provided in Figure 4
6Clerides et al. (2015) report correlations between market share weighted averages. They report a
correlation between the Lerner and Adjusted Lerner indices of 0.86, between Lerner and Profit Bone of
0.33 and between Adjusted Lerner and Profit Boone of 0.31 (they do not compute Market Share Boone
indicators).
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5.1 Loan and Firm Level Data
Our most comprehensive data source in the “Formato 341” (341 form) from Colombia’s
financial supervisor (Superintendencia Financiera) which contains loan-level data on the
universe of loans granted by banks. From this source we obtain a total of 3.058.160 loans;
a full set of descriptive statistics is presented in Table 3. The median-sized loan in this
dataset is of USD29,516, while the maximum loan size if USD131.1 million.7 Most loans
–about 80% of them– are floating rate and do not post collateral. The average loan maturity
is 2.2 quarters, but over half of the loans in our dataset are very short term (one quarter);
the longest maturity is approximately 11.5 years.
With this dataset we are also able to measure the length of a credit relationship, which
is on average 12 quarters. Finally, from this loan-level data, it can be seen that the
typical firm is usually current in its financial obligations (median of current delinquencies
is zero) and only 17% of firms has ever been delinquent on a loan (average of “previous
delinquencies to a bank is 0.17). Figure 3 shows how real interest rates evolved over the
period we study for loans in the main industries of the economy.
Our second source of data is a firm-level dataset collected from ORBIS Americas
(Colombia). From this source we obtain data on firm assets (as a measure of size) from
474,154 non-financial firms, for a total of 1.66 million observations (3.5 observations per
firm on average). Mean and median assets reported in this dataset are, respectively, USD2.6
million and USD56,426.
These two data sources are combined with the bank-level dataset that we constructed
in Section 4, and whose descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1.
5.2 Bank Market Power and the Cost of Credit: Baseline Results
We now turn to the estimation of the effect of bank market power on the firm’s cost of
credit. Our dependent variables is the real interest rate charged on each loan. In this sense,
our empirical exercise is closest to that found in Fungacova et al. (2017). However, since
we know the identity of the bank which granted each loan, we are able to match our firm
and loan level dataset with our previously constructed bank-level (instead of country-level)
market power measures as well as with bank-specific characteristics. With this bank-firm-
loan dataset at hand, we are in a position to study the impact that market power may
have on the cost of accessing credit for non-financial firms. In particular, we estimate the
7All figures here and in what follows are expressed in USD at 2015 current exchange rates
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following model:
irl = μ + LlΨ + XlΘ + vl (6)
where: irl is the real interest rate of loan l (given by bank b in period t), Ll is the Lerner
index of bank b in period t (i.e., the market power of the bank which gave the loan at
the time it did so); Xl is a vector of loan, bank and firm characteristics; and μ and Θ are
vectors of parameters.8 Or main interest is in the parameter estimate associated with bank
market power,Ψ, as well as some interactions that are introduced afterwards. Equation (6)
is estimated as a large cross-section for the full sample of matched loans, under different
sets of time, firm and bank fixed effects (and the combinations therein), and with standard
errors clustered at the firm-bank level to capture the potential credit relationship dependent
structure of errors.
We begin by estimating a “naive” model in which we include firm, bank, and time fixed
effects, but not firm-time or firm-bank (pair/match) fixed effects, and do not control for
the length of credit relationships. The first column of table 4 presents the results.
In this model, all coefficients pertaining loan, firm and bank characteristics appear to be
statistically significant and of the expected sign, although some of them seem much more
important than others. For instance, interest rates are lower for fixed-rate loans, but the
difference is rather small: floating-rate loans are only 0.6 percentage points more expensive
on average. On the other hand, posting collateral is associated with substantially –up to
four percentage points– lower interest rate on a loan. As expected, longer term loans are
more expensive, while loans granted to larger firms are cheaper. Interestingly, interest rates
increase with the size and profitability of the bank making the loan, even after conditioning
on the bank’s market power. Loans granted by banks concentrated on commercial loans
tend to have lower interest rates.
Finally, the coefficient on the Lerner index suggests that, on average and at first glance,
lower market power is associated with higher interest rates. The effect appears to be small
though: a drop in market power like that experienced by the typical bank in 2006-2007 –the
largest drop in the sample period– is associated with interest rates that are 0.4 percentage
points higher.
Next, we exploit the additional information available in our matched dataset, and study
8In some cases we also include some firm characteristics as additional controls. However, when we use
firm-time fixed effects, these absorb any time-varying, firm-specific variables.
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the effects of (i) the length of credit relationships,9 and (ii) the potential heterogeneity in
the effect of bank market power according to firm size. That is, we estimate the model:
irl = μ + LlΨ + XlΘ + Ll × FirmSizelΦ + Ll × LengthRellΩ + vl, (7)
where firm size is captured by (the log of) firm assets, and the length of relationship is
computed as the difference between the date of loan l, and the period in which the firm-bank
pair appeared for the first time in the loan-level dataset. The inclusion of this variable
capturing credit history is a conceptual and methodological contribution of this paper,
since it is not available from the kind of firm- and bank-level datasets used by previous
studies like Fungacova et al. (2017), Alvarez and Jara (2016) and van Leuvensteijn et al.
(2013). We view the length of a credit relationship as a better measure of asymmetric
information for a specific bank-firm pair than other measures used in previous work such
as firm size.
Now the total effect of bank market power on the cost of firm finance is defined as:
∂il
∂Ll
= Ψ + FirmSizelΦ + LengthRellΩ (8)
The results from this exercise, shown in column (2) of Table 4, paint a nuanced picture of
bank competitive behavior. First, the positive coefficient (point estimate of 0.07) associated
with the level of LengthRell shows that extending a credit relationship for an additional
year (four quarters) tends to increase the interest rate charged on loans by about 0.28
percentage points. This result may be suggestive of switching costs and hold-up problems,
and supports the existence of a specific firm-bank market power (i.e., banks appear to gain
bargaining power with firms as they stay longer together).
Next, as captured by the coefficient on the interaction Ll × FirmSizel, and shown
graphically in the left panel of Figure 5, banks loosing market power tend to increase
interest rates to small firms (for a firm with the median length of relationship): a drop in
market power like that experienced by the typical bank in 2006-2007 (0.2 points in Lerner
index) can reduce loan interest rates by up to 0.8 percentage points for the smallest firms.
This is precisely what Fungacova et al. (2017) reports as its main result. However the
right panel of Figure 5 shows that as banks loose market power, they lower interest rates
to firms with which they have shorter credit relationships and increase them to firms with
9This variable is constructed by measuring the time distance between the period in which the loan was
granted, and the first period in which the firm has a loan with that same bank in the sample.
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which they have longer credit relationships (for a median-sized firm): a drop of 0.2 points
in Lerner index can increase interest rates by up to 1 percentage point for the firms with
the longest banking relationships.
In our view, this last result does not conform well with the so-called “information
hypothesis”. According to this theory, more bank competition (lower bank market power)
should induce banks to charge higher interest rates to firms with short credit histories as
they require more investment in information acquisition. Instead, our results show that
banks compensate losing objective market power –as measured by the Lerner index– by
extracting informational rents from their existing credit relationships. This is consistent
with an established literature on banking switching costs that increase with the duration
of credit relationships, and lead to informational lock-in and hold-up problems (Kim et al.
(2003); Egarius and Weill (2016); Ioannidou and Ongena (2010)).
Finally, in columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 we study the implications of being able
to control for firm-time and firm-bank unobserved heterogeneity; that is, we estimate
equation (6) under firm-time and firm-bank fixed effects, which, importantly, helps us
capture firm-specific demand shocks and features that are idiosyncratic to the firm-bank
match. Results show remarkably stable coefficients for the loan-level controls (size of
loan, maturity, collateral, fixed/floating) and some of the bank-level controls. A notable
exception is the coefficient associated with bank size and to some extent bank profitability.
That is, once we control for firm-specific demand shocks, larger banks and more profitable
banks appear to charge higher interest rates.
Turning to the coefficients on the Lerner index and its interactions with firm size and
bank-firm credit history, we confirm that relationship between market power and loan
interest rates is critically mediated by firm size and the length of firm-bank relationships,
although the actual size of the coefficients changes in some cases. Notice, however, that
once we include firm-bank fixed effects, the coefficient on the level of relationship length is
very imprecisely estimated. This is due to the fact that a large number of firms have only
one loan in the sample, and, for these, the firm-bank fixed effect is highly colinear with the
length of the credit relationship.
5.3 Potential Market Power and the Cost of Credit
We now estimate the baseline model of section 5.2 using the approach of Koetter et al.
(2012) of capturing potential –rather than actual– market power. That is, we replace Ll
with the efficiency-adjusted Lerner index computed in section 4. Results from this exercise
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are shown in Table 5.
The first thing to notice is that the sign, size and statistical significance of all coefficients
are all remarkably similar to those of Table 4. This is not entirely surprising given the high
correlation between the Lerner and Adjusted Lerner indexes (0.82, see Table 2). However,
the results from the adjusted Lerner show two noteworthy differences with respect to the
Lerner exercise: (1) The average effect of bank market power on interest rates is somewhat
smaller, (2) this effect is less sensitive to firm size and more sensitive to the length of credit
relationships. In other words, for the average-sized firm, the informational lock-in effect or
hold-up problem is somewhat stronger.
5.4 Alternative Firm-level Dataset
As a final check on our results we conduct the exercises of sections 5.2 and 5.3 using
a smaller sample of Colombian firms coming from a dataset that is more readily avail-
able to researchers. The source of these data is a government body (Superintendencia de
Sociedades) that collects accounting firm-level data from 41,249 firms in Colombia. In
this dataset firms are typically larger (compared to our more comprehensive dataset from
ORBIS) and the industrial sector is overrepresented. These two features imply that this
dataset is precisely biased toward the firms that have several credit relationships.10
The results from this estimation are consistent with the aforementioned size bias. In
particular, the marginal effect of market power as a function of size becomes flatter and,
in contrast to our previous results, is at all times positive, since it corresponds to the far
right portion of Figure 5. On the other hand, the marginal effect of market power as a
function of credit history appears remarkably stable.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have provided an in-depth analysis of competition behavior in the corpo-
rate credit market by Colombian banks during the last decade. Our estimates of market
power, using four popular measures from the new empirical industrial organization litera-
ture, show that average market power fell dramatically in the mid-2000s, rose again in the
early 2010s and has been fairly stable since.
10This is why even though this dataset contains about a tenth of the total number of firms found in the
ORBIS dataset, we are left with over 50 percent of the observations.
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When using detailed bank, firm, and loan-level data to estimate the effect of bank
marker power on the cost of firm finance, we obtain a rather nuanced picture of bank
competitive behavior. In particular, it appears that as banks loose market power, they
reduce interest rates for firms with which they have shorter credit histories, and do the
opposite with firms with which they have had a longer relationships. This is suggestive of
the existence of switching costs and hold-out problems that has been documented before.
As noted before, our analysis must be taken with care, since we lack a proper identifi-
cation strategy that could allow for a strictly causal interpretation of our results. And yet,
our rich dataset enabled us to introduce conceptual and methodological innovations that
make these results strongly suggestive of causal effects. This kind of data could also be
used to establish events of collusion or characterize entry/expansion episodes that can help
understand better how the distribution of market power affects access to credit, especially
in economies with underdeveloped credit markets.
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Tables and Additional Figures
Table 1: Bank-Level Descriptive Statistics
Mean Stand. Dev. 25 % 50% 75%
Total Cost/Total Assets 10.55 4.21 7.76 9.75 11.88
Loans/Total Assets 60.23 18.02 52.44 62.07 68.97
Securities/Total Assets 22.80 17.88 13.32 19.73 32.28
Interest Expenses/Deposits 12.30 7.99 8.49 10.85 13.84
Other Expenses/Fixed Assets 18.77 25.58 1.80 8.01 23.88
Personnel Expenses/Total Assets 1.84 1.91 0.52 1.24 2.34
Equity/Total Assets 14.46 10.41 9.36 12.00 15.16
ROA (%) 2.29 2.57 1.70 2.61 3.52
Commercial Loans/Net Loans 55.67 25.83 40.33 54.86 76.53
Housing Loans/Net Loans 7.42 12.53 0.00 0.73 10.96
Consumption Loans/Net Loans 34.32 24.53 16.52 30.46 47.42
Table 2: Bank Market Power and Concentration Correlation Matrix
Lerner Adj. Lerner MS Boone Profit Boone Top-3 loans HHI loans
Lerner 1.00
Adj. Lerner 0.82** 1.00
MS Boone 0.35** 0.67** 1.00
Profit Boone 0.58** 0.44** 0.34** 1.00
Top-3 loans -0.25 -0.68** 0.02 -0.77* 1.00
HHI loans -0.14 -0.52** 0.20 -0.66 0.87** 1.00
Note: ** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
Table 3: Loan-Level Descriptive Statistics
Mean S.D. 50 % Min Max
Ln Loan Amount 4.16 2.86 4.41 -6.07 12.79
Loan’s Maturity (Quarters) 2.18 2.43 1.00 1.00 46.00
Fixed Interest Rate (%) 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 1.00
Collateral 0.21 0.41 0.00 0.00 1.00
Previous Delinquency to Bank 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00
Number of Delinquencies to Bank 2.11 4.85 0.00 0.00 72.00
Length of the Banking Relationship 12.16 11.00 9.00 0.00 43.00
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Table 4: Bank Market Power and Firm Finance: Lerner Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Real Interest Rate Real Interest Rate Real Interest Rate Real Interest Rate
Lerner -1.809*** -9.874*** -0.803*** -7.846***
(0.154) (0.604) (0.197) (1.665)
Ln Loan Amount -1.032*** -1.035*** -0.998*** -1.045***
(-0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011)
Loan’s Maturity 0.079*** 0.082*** 0.079*** 0.085***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
Fixed 0.620*** 0.612*** 0.467*** 0.480***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.025)
Collateral -4.010*** -3.992*** -4.049*** -4.301***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.027) (0.033)
Bank’s Ln(Assets) 0.345*** 0.468*** 1.701*** 2.250***
(0.093) (0.093) (0.125) (0.156)
Bank’s Roa 0.144*** 0.209*** 0.285*** 0.273***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.027)
Bank’s Leverage -0.132*** -0.154*** -0.099*** -0.175***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013)
>70 % Commercial Loans -0.160*** -0.070 -0.151** -0.054
(0.051) (0.051) (0.065) (0.084)
Ln(Assets) -0.209*** -0.423***
(0.013) (0.019)
Length of Relationship 0.070*** 2.521
(0.003) (1.3e5)
Ln(Assets) x Lerner 0.635*** 0.647***
(0.041) (0.110)
Length of Relationship x Lerner -0.109*** -0.179***
(0.007) (0.014)
Observations 1,555,043 1,555,043 1,282,816 918,391
R-squared 0.545 0.546 0.756 0.757
Firm Fixed Effects    
Time Fixed Effects    
Bank Fixed Effects    
Firm-Time Fixed Effects  
Firm-Bank Fixed Effects  
Standard errors are clustered at the firm-bank level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Bank Market Power and Firm Finance: Adjusted Lerner
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Real Interest Rate Real Interest Rate Real Interest Rate Real Interest Rate
Adjusted Lerner -1.545*** -8.804*** -1.504*** -6.923***
(0.176) (0.653) (0.241) (1.861)
Ln Loan Amount -1.032*** -1.034*** -0.998*** -1.045***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011)
Loan’s Maturity 0.078*** 0.081*** 0.079*** 0.085***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005)
Fixed 0.616*** 0.606*** 0.466*** 0.479***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.022) (0.025)
Collateral -4.008*** -3.991*** -4.049*** -4.305***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.027) (0.033)
Bank’s Ln(Assets) 0.249*** 0.383*** 1.702*** 2.136***
(0.091) (0.091) (0.125) (0.153)
Bank’s Roa 0.143*** 0.214*** 0.331*** 0.290***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.025) (0.029)
Bank’s Leverage -0.126*** -0.151*** -0.100*** -0.179***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.013)
>70 % Commercial Loans -0.107** -0.014 -0.151** -0.090
(0.051) (0.051) (0.065) (0.084)
Ln(Assets) -0.209*** -0.411***
(0.013) (0.020)
Length of Relationship 0.084*** 2.910
(0.003) (1.3e5)
Ln(Assets) x AdjLerner 0.616*** 0.616***
(0.044) (0.121)
Length of Relationship x AdjLerner -0.151*** -0.229***
(0.008) (0.016)
Observations 1,555,043 1,555,043 1,282,816 918,391
R-squared 0.545 0.546 0.756 0.757
Firm Fixed Effects    
Time Fixed Effects    
Bank Fixed Effects    
Firm-Time Fixed Effects  
Firm-Bank Fixed Effects  
Standard errors are clustered at the firm-bank level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Bank Market Power and Firm Finance: Alternative Dataset
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Lerner Lerner Adj Lerner Adj Lerner
Market Power 0.818*** 0.024 0.214 2.628***
(0.273) (0.806) (0.330) (0.926)
Ln Loan Amount -1.019*** -1.018*** -1.019*** -1.017***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Loan’s Maturity 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.052***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Fixed 0.292*** 0.289*** 0.294*** 0.288***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Collateral -3.663*** -3.661*** -3.663*** -3.667***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Bank’s Ln(Assets) 2.378*** 2.361*** 2.409*** 2.279***
(0.173) (0.171) (0.172) (0.169)
Bank’s Roa 0.145*** 0.205*** 0.168*** 0.187***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.034) (0.034)
Bank’s Leverage -0.185*** -0.236*** -0.189*** -0.242***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
>70 % Commercial Loans -0.173* -0.114 -0.229** -0.200**
(0.099) (0.097) (0.100) (0.099)
Length of Relationship -16.319 -17.53
(2.27e5) (2.27e5)
Ln(Assets) x Lerner 0.321*** 0.139
(0.081) (0.091)
Length of Relationship x Lerner -0.180*** -0.246***
(0.017) (0.019)
Observations 580,811 580,072 580,811 580,072
R-squared 0.726 0.727 0.726 0.726
Firm Fixed Effects    
Time Fixed Effects    
Bank Fixed Effects    
Firm-Time Fixed Effects    
Firm-Bank Fixed Effects    
Standard errors are clustered at the firm-bank level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 3: Real Interest Rates by Industry


















Figure 5: Heterogeneous Effects of Bank Market Power
Note: The figures plot marginal effects obtained using the coefficients from column 5 in tables 3 and 4.
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7 Apendix
7.1 Mergers and Acquisitions in the Colombian Banking System
Table 7: M&A in the Colombian Banking Industry 2004-2014
Mergers and Acquisitions New Entrants
Banco Sudameris acquires Banco Tequendama (2005) Bancamia (2008)
Davivienda acquires Banco Superior (2004) Banco WWB (2010)
BBVA acquires Banco Granahorrar (2005) Bancoomeva (2011)
Banco Colmena merges with Banco Caja Social (2005) Banco Finandina (2011)
Banco Conavi merges with Bancolombia (2005) Banco Falabella (2011)
Banco Union Colombiano merges with Banco de Occidente (2006) Banco Pichincha (2011)
Banco de Bogota acquires Megabanco (2006) Banco Cooperativo Coopcentral 2013
Davivienda acquires Bancafe-Granbanco (2006) Banco Santander de Negocios 2013
Scotiabank acquires controlling ownership of Colpatria (2011)
7.2 Data sources, variable definitions and TOC estimation
7.2.1 Bank-level data
All of our bank-specific measures come from the financial supervisor in Colombia, Super-
intendencia Financiera. In particular, we access the excel workbooks provided by SuperFi-
nanciera under the link https://www.superfinanciera.gov.co/publicacion/60776 (“Estados
Financieros - Moneda total - COLGAAP”). These spreadsheets contain both balance sheet
and income statement accounts. Our variable definitions are as follows:
• Total bank assets: is taken as account number 100000 (“Activo”).
• Fixed Assets: is taken as account number 180000 (“Propiedades y equipos”).
• Total bank investments: is taken as account number 130000 (“Inversiones”).
• Equity: is taken as account number 300000 (“Patrimonio”).
• Total bank net loans: is taken as account number 140000 (“Cartera de creditos y
operaciones de leasing financiero“) which records net commercial, consumer, hous-
ing, and microcredit loans; and we exclude net financial leasing loans by subtracting
account numbers for gross commercial, consumer, housing, and microcredit leasing
loans (141183 to 141198; 141983 to 141998; 143283 to 143298; 143383 to 143398;
143683 to 143698 ; 144183 to 144198; 144283 to 144298; 144283 to 144498; 144583
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to 144598; 145083 to 145098; 145983 to 145998; 146083 to 146098; 146283 to 146298;
146383 to 146398; 146583 to 146598; 146683-146698; 146783 to 146798; 146883 to
146898; 146983 to 146998; 147083 to 147098) and adding accounts for commer-
cial, consumer, housing, and microcredit leasing provisions (149109, 149114, 149119,
149124, 149149, 149309, 149314, 149319, 149324, 149329, 149508, 149509, 149513,
149514, 149518, 149519, 149523, 149524, 149528, 149529, 149810).
• Net Commercial loans: is the sum of account numbers 145900, 146000, 146200,146300
and 146500 to 147000 which record commercial loans under different risk categories
(A to E) and using different collateral (“garantia idonea” and “otra garantia”);
and exclude net commercial leasing loans by subtracting account numbers for gross
commercial leasing loans (145983 to 145998; 146083 to 146098; 146283 to 146298;
146383 to 146398; 146583 to 146598; 146683-146698; 146783 to 146798; 146883 to
146898; 146983 to 146998; 147083 to 147098) and adding commercial leasing provi-
sions (149508,149509,149513,149514,149518,149519,149523,149524,149528,149529).
• Financial Income: is the sum of the account numbers for interest income (4102000),
commissions (4115000), price level restatement (411015), return on investments (410403
+ 410404 + 410405 + 410409 + 410421 + 410423 + 410424 + 4123000), dividends
(414000), net profit in investment sales (4116000 + 4125000 – 5116000 – 5125000)
investment valuation (410700 + 410800 + 410900 + 411100 + 411200 + 411300 –
510600 – 510800 – 510900 – 511100 – 511200 – 511400), other net financial income
(410400 + 411005 + 412800 + 412900 – 410403 – 410404 – 410405 – 410409 – 410421
– 410423 – 410424 – 512800 – 512900), and net changes (413500 – 513500).
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7.2.2 TOC estimation results
Table 8: TOC Translog Function Estimates
Dependent variable: ln(operating cost) Coefficient t-value P > |t|
ln_loans -0.177 -0.30 0.772
ln_loans_sq 0.118 2.79 0.015
ln_invest 0.637 1.22 0.242
ln_invest_sq 0.081 3.02 0.009
ln_input_price 1.395 2.06 0.058
ln_input_price_sq 0.061 2.99 0.010
ln_input_price2 0.677 3.97 0.001
ln_input_price_sq 0.0012 0.17 0.864
ln_loans_invest -0.182 -3.12 0.008
ln_loans_input -0.060 -3.97 0.001
ln_loans_input2 0.007 0.09 0.931
ln_invest_input 0.014 0.94 0.361
ln_invest_input2 -0.066 -1.25 0.236
ln_input1_input2 -0.019 -0.90 0.384
ln_eqty_ass -0.112 -1.40 0.182
Bank fixed-effects YES
Time fixed-effects YES
Bank-level clustered std errors YES
R2 (overall) 0.983
Number of panels (banks) 15
Observations 654
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